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 A friend, to whom I suggested a collaborative paper, wrote me back with a few execellent signposts and directions we should take; he added, en lieu for a small area of legal philosophy, that he “won’t do any postmodern, though, as he’s already done that in younger years”.  Fine with me: Not considering myself a postmodernist myself, despite my affection for some authors and individual works, such as Lyotard’s post foundational argumentative logic in Le Differend, which are often labelled such (though I find such labels and the ideological effects they stand for often misleading if not a bit distasteful – it is often the followers and self-declared disciples of these authors who imagine a “movement” such as postmodernism). Nonetheless, as we were setting out to write about a problem area involving the use and abuse of transnational law, I am curious as to a similarity in two very different authors, writing about very different subject areas; one of them is often considered a “postmodern” writer: Roland Barthes. I think it was Jean-Claude Milner who wrote in his Le Périle structural (2002, quoted in Samoyault 2015: 319 Fn. 2 and paraphrased here), in a comparison of the critique of literature’s language in Sartre and Barthes, that the latter saw that literature was an ideological form and thus implied decision on l’écriture (‘writing’/Schreibweise) and thus every decision on l’écriture included an ideologue (the word dialectics was not used in the quote, non surprisingly for in the heavily Hegelian-influenced pensée or imaginary dialectics implies some necessary materiality, which, for example, a Kantian use of the term does not). Despite a resonance with Althusser, I was more struck by the possibility for analogy with Morris R. Cohen’s and Oliver Wendel Holmes Jr.’s (and to subsequently, Benjamin Cardozo’s) views on jurisprudence – which is of some unquestionable importance, given that the opposite view to theirs stemming from US corporate law (, a certain anglo-american legal positivism,) and the econo-legal Chicago school (à la Posner) in particular on “contract”, “property” and “corporate person” as legal kinds have become influential, if not even hegemonic in international trade laws, and subsequently on transnational jurisprudence.
Myers summarizes (1977: 671), that

“[t]he inherent normative content and scientific structure of the legal systemled Cohen to challenge certain practices and dogmas of American law. He was among the first to attack the phonograph theory of judicial decision-making the notion that judges find and do not make the law.’  An unconscious or hidden establishment of new legal rules under the guise  of stare decisis,  legal fictions, or vague concepts like reasonableness, betrays the science of law. Agreeingwith Holmes, Cohen similarly noted that use of the fourteenth amendment’s due process and equal protection clauses often conceals deep-seated economic and ethical motives.’”

It was the point of Morris R. Cohen that judges and lawyers practice of the law was not, as we could say with Barthes, ideologically innocent; instead the (practice of the) law was influenced by them, thus law was made; but as laws also carried the baggage of their history this was not an arbitrary process either. Thus, I think, Barthes’s point about literature as Milner portrays it, is a fine analogy for Morris R. Cohen’s (and co.) thought on law, and it’s rather surprising to me, that this appears missing in Desautels-Stein’s recent analysis as far as I seem to be aware.

Literature:
Desautels-Stein, Justin (2018) The Jurisprudence of Style: A Structuralist History of American Pragmatism and Liberal Legal Thought, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press
Myers, Edward B. (1977) “Liberalism and Legal Science: The Jurisprudence of Morris Raphael Cohen” in: Notre Dame L. Rev. 52: 653ff
Samoyault, Tiphaine (2015) Roland Barthes: Die Biographie. Berlin: Suhrkamp.

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The following is a draft for a footnote from a paper on transnational law I am working on. In the footnote, I am proposing that one of the two main social phenomenological approaches, that of that Austrian banker, is not useful (the other one would be Luhmann’s systems theory, which is useful only within limits, i.e. to describe, a posteriori, formal organizations).

Along those lines, one can add that Gephardt, to do his due diligence as was necessary in terms of national disciplinary canon in sociology in the 1990s, dedicates a chapter to a hobby social philosopher, the Austrian banker, Schuetz, only to find that in the banker had no use in his works for norms, values, and law: As far as we can see, Schütz embarks on an attempt to constitute societal reality without taking into account values and norms, and definitely without law. (1993: 58, my translation of: “Soweit wir sehen konnten unternimmt Schütz den Versuch gesellschaftliche Wirklichkeit ohne Rückgriff auf Normen und Werten und schon gar nicht Recht zu konstituieren.”)

This is all somewhat non-surprising for an elitist, neoliberal person such as Schütz who conducts scholarship as white collar person’s a past-time. Gephardt (59) correctly mentions that Parsons’s, of course, saw through Schütz from the start in a their correspondence which was fueled by Schütz’s misunderstanding (according to Gephardt, although it’s more a mix of Schütz’s limitations as a scholar on the one had, and a stubborn, typical elitarian refusal to acknowledge Parsons’s polite attempt at signaling that he’s just not interested in the kind of empirics- and reality-freed– or as Parsons calls it fictional – philosophy, that Schütz is dabbling in. Schütz thinks that while it is “possible to think” someone’s orientation could be guided by norms/values (following in Gephardt’s depiction, ibid.), Schütz then dissuades such an approach with the following – no less, inherently normative, for giving a normative evaluation of the value of values and norms – statement (in: Schütz, Parsons, Grathoff 1978: 31):

“In other words, if the concept of normative value is interpreted from a strictly subjective point of view, no reason can be discovered why the choice between means (goals) and ends ruled by a normative value should differ from any other choice that is not ruled by a normative value.”

In, again, different words: Schütz wants us to accept (something that is actually impossible, namely) a flat (social) epistemology. And this is understandable, for it fits nicely with neoliberal ideology. Schütz, we should recall, is not only a banker, but a follower of von Hayek (who, by the way, himself ridiculed Schütz’s “intellectual” efforts behind his back) as well as a member of the neoliberal and libertarian Mont Pelerin society of which, for example, billionaire Charles G. Koch is a member. The denial of the existence of social epistemic privileges that bankers and billionaires have and continue to enjoy requires, to truly work at least on a theoretical level, a to suppose a flat (social) epistemology (and consider the distribution of wealth and social capital as social ontologically given); respectively the subject cannot be produced through subjectivation as Foucault would critique (something that would be perfectly intelligible for Parsons). One can imagine the acrobatics that Berger/Luckmann had to conduct in order to create something sociologically productive, while suggesting they were standing on the (intellectually rather tiny) shoulders of Schütz – who would, probably and rightfully so, be utterly forgotten had it not been for Berger/Luckmann. However, since intellectually we can already do not only the same but even better with Weber and Husserl proper, it’s time to pack away the banker and rid us of this crypto-neoliberal theorizing.

[Note for clarification: I think the problem with flat epistemology here is that (a) Schütz conflates flat epistemology with flat social epistemology; and (b) normatively imputes flat epistemology and then hides this normative imputation through reification and committing other fallacies. While the idea of a flat epistemology in general in the theory of science seems like a wishful idea (McKenzie Wark in his critical account of Timothy Morton proposes such an avenue [http://www.publicseminar.org/2015/12/from-ooo-to-poo/]), due to the info-order problem alone it’s impossible. It is debatable whether, on the other hand, ontologies can be flat (following Roy Bhaskar’s critical realist polemics but through a twisting it into becoming serious, Manuel DeLanda through a Deleuzean reading, seems to think so; whereas Graham Harman argues that ontologies cannot be entirely flat [“….not all translations are equal.” (2011)]). In a more in-depth discussion, we would also have to address Peter Unger’s work. Let’s only add this here: one critical issue is that serious proponents of a general flat epistemology (I do not include as to be taken seriously Schütz, because his evocation of epistemological flatness in general serves the purpose of flattening social epistemology in order to create a warrant for [epistemic and social] privilege that need not for it cannot be justified but can merely rest its claim on entitlement as simply being the “present way things are” due to a sort of anti-realist structure, which Schütz inherently shares with neoliberal legal scholarship of the economico-juridical Chicago School and the so-called Originalists among interpretants of the US constitution such as the late Judge Scalia) like McKenzie Wark, and, implicitly perhaps Timothy Morton and Levi Bryant, are poised towards a connection with flat ontology or near-flat ontology (à la Harman) as a sort complement or compensatory necessity, however, it would be wrong to conduct the simpleton “Hegel-synthesis” and claim that these made for onto-epistemology; on the contrary, onto-epistemology is neither synthesis nor hybrid or aggregate, but stands as a genuine Third. And, one must say, that the attribute of a “flatness” may not make any sense for onto-epistemology, or at least not in the way it would for ontologies or epistemologies (nor can epistemologies flattened only in order to be used to create a flattening criterion for ontologies – this was roughly the point of Bhaskar’s criticism of flat ontologies being flattened as to privilege the human point of view in a way similar to what Haraway exposed as the god-trick), because – if anything – onto-epistemology is not flat in this way but would help us understand how “flatness” is done/performed. In addition, with Bhaskar and critical realism, we are also enabled renounce the likes of Schütz, since the kind of “flatness” Schütz and his ilk evoke, is effectively put out of service by Bhaskar who directed his act of deposing “flatness” against it as being a feature of positivism; thus we can say it applies against legal positivism and also against privilege-/privi-legal-positivism. For transnational law, especially in regard of “extraction”, Bhaskar’s rejection of flattenings and, subsequently the respective positivisms, in particular alerts us to the conclusion that agents and actors entangled in extraction and/or in transnational legal practice and law are not all of them (perhaps not even most of them) human.

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“We need to get over Foucault.” I say this as someone who is a declared Foucauldean. And what I mean is not that we “forget Foucault” or that he was wrong. What I mean is that many of the critical tools and ideas he introduced are still currently valid. For a thinker, who insisted on the geographical, t(r)opological, and temporal situatedness of his own scholarship and of intellectuals as specialized intellectuals in general, that his scholarship is still so current, pertinent, and useful (and seems that it will be for the foreseeable future) is horrifying. We should already have gotten over Foucault, because his tools, his analyses, his politics, and his problems should no longer be our own, contemporary ones. We should already have gotten over them, and thus gotten over Foucault. Therefore, it is time that we get – perhaps with Foucault – over Foucault.

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Following an expanding a conceptual proposal by Terry Shinn and its adoption by Erik Lettkemann (Shinn 2002, 2008; Lettkemann 2017), we can deploy the concepts “research technology” to the way that BioEconomy deploys biotechnologies – even though it does so in the a decidedly vague sense, whereas Shinn’s conceptual framework is usuallu deployed to more concrete cases such as for example by Lettkemann to the case of transmission electron microscopy. For Shinn, “research technologies” form a “transverse regime” for the production of knowledge as well as “artefacts” (we could maybe also say, instead with Rheinberger with whose work there are similiarities, “epistemic objects”) , meaning that those practitioners who use these technologies are not bound by the institutional boundaries their disciplines, fields, institutions, and facilities normally set up.

The social locus of the transverse regime is conceived as an ‘interstitial arena’ arranged around ‘generic instrumentation’ designed to meet the requirements of a wide range of academic and industrial audiences. Each interstitial arena is populated by a community of research-technologists. They work on widening the application possibilities of their instrumentation, collaborating with heterogeneous audiences who seek to adopt the instrumentation’s generic uses. Generic instrumentation designates a research-related type of multipurpose device, including, for example, ‘automatic switching systems, the ultracentrifuge, the laser, cybernetics, Fourier transform spectroscopy, the Cooley-Tukey algorithm, the C++ object oriented computer language, the scanning tunnelling microscope, etc.’ (Shinn, 2008: 2). The widespread diffusion of generic instrumentation is accompanied by the development of a ‘metrology’ that serves as a cross-disciplinary lingua franca. (Lettkemann 2017: 394)

Lettkemann further proposes the distinction between

between nomads and settlers : while nomads live the life of freelancers, travelling from one laboratory to the next, settlers establish host laboratories and invite researchers from neighbouring fields to collaborate. (395)

This conceptual distinction is particularly useful, because when we introduce to it the geopolitics of Global North and Global South and the epistemological attitude/entitlement exuding from the Global North that Colin Scott described in “Science for the West, Myth for the Rest”, it points out how Western sciences establish host facilities in non-Western/Global Southern territories and (epistemically) coerce non-Western interlocutors. Thus, we can speak here of a form epistemic settler colonialism. The biotechnologies of the BioEconomy are an excellent example.

Literature:

Lettkemann, Eric. 2017. “Nomads and Settlers in the Research-Technology Regime: The Case of Transmission Electron Microscopy.” Social Science Information 56 (3): 393–415. doi:10.1177/0539018417719396.

Shinn, Terry. 2002. “Intellectual Cohesion and Organizational Divisions in Science.” Revue Française de Sociologie 43: 99–122. doi:10.2307/3322759.

———. 2008. Research-Technology and Cultural Change: Instrumentation, Genericity, Transversality. GEMAS Studies in Social Analysis. Oxford: Bardwell.

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For Gilles Lhuilier

Inspired by his friend Goethe, Alexander von Humboldt in 1807 publishes with his Essai sur la gèographie des plantes what has been called the world’s first ecological book, originating a way of seeing and thinking about “nature” as an interconnected whole. This “whole” became quickly understood under the term “ecology” (coined by Ernst Haeckel in reference to an idea of “economy of nature” in 1866) and the (developmental) connection between the unit of interest in biology (“organism”) or the social sciences (“society and/or individual)” was construed to be with the “environment”/”Umwelt”. Today, and especially in reference to the European and French discourse on bioeconomy, the term “écosystéme” is is seeing a renaissance, given that a main area of both theoretical, empirical-conceptual, and practical interest in the bioeconomy is geared towards so-called “ecosystem services”.

“Ecosystem”, as proposed by botanist A.G. Tansley in correspondence with A.R. Clapham in 1935, and was quickly introduced into the discourse of the social sciences – where “system” had already gained currency first through John Boodin and later was continued by Talcott Parsons (one should, however and in all fairness, not forget Parsons intake of biology, as well as his human condition paradigm’s reliance on environmental factors) – where from the late 1940s to the early 1960s human ecology was vividly discussed as being the main problem or reference point for the study of “the social” by anthropologists such as Alfred Kroeber or even – following in the footsteps of Parks’s and Burgess’s Chicago School – Leo Schnore and Otis Duncan Dudley, the latter becoming a founding father of “quantitative sociology”, with their POET scheme (population, organziation, environment, technology) and Schnore in particular saw lineage herein with Durkheim. Tansley’s contribution, it should not be forgotten, of “ecosystem” conceptualized as a system in terms of engineering and energy, had a rival in Jan Smuts – of “imperialist” fame – notion of “holism”. The Tansley-Smuts debate is, by some, viewed as symptomatic and archetyptical for the 1920s and 30s, which is – historically speaking in light of social thought – at the heels of Frederick L. Holmsted, Partick Geddes and other “conservationist” thinkers who began to assume connections existed between “the social” and “nature”, which required not only biological scrutiny but also preservation. And yet, repeatedly “nature”, “environment”, and “ecology” have disappeared from the “sociological imagination” for a variety of continuous theory-political reasons and eventually the rise of a school of social constructionism, that was decidedly human exemptionalistic – not entirely dissimilar from human exceptionalism in genetic research, a human exemptionalist stance propounds that humans and their technological civilization are exempt from the influences of the bio-physical environment. Even animal-human relations (anthropozoology) have – with the exception of perhaps reference by Gerhard Lenski – not held sociologists attention for decades and come under more intensified scrutiny only very recently and, perhaps, not without the rise of feminist and postcolonial science studies and the revere across disciplines that an eminent scholar like Donna Haraway would garner. In between times, and despite “ecological problems” such as “smog” being discussed since right after World War II, it wasn’t until the end of the 1970s that William Catton and Riley Dunlap voice their frustration with sociology’s ignorance toward the “biophysical environment” – right after psychiatry’s opening a new discourse with Georg Engel’s 1977 “biopsychosocial model”, which, too, would lead to new questions of “environments role” in the life of the un/healthy mind – and become the founders of what would be known today as “environmental sociology”.

[…….]

 

Based on this history, a conceptual-disciplinary debate the social sciences, and especially sociology (and affecting its internal sub-disciplines rural-, urban-, economic-, xyz-sociology), face is the question what role “environment/nature” as a whole and non-human or more-than-human agencies in particular should play, a debate that can be exemplified in the distinction between environmental sociology and ecological sociology. Thought of as simultaneously a clear-cut distinction and a spectrum, environmental sociology defines, roughly, a that “environment” is treated by the sub-sociology “environmental sociology” with, at best, potential derivate consequences that general sociology or other sub-sociologies may acknowledge (based on the traditional German distinction between allgemeiner and spezieller Soziologie) and that this sub-sociology studies the relations and interactions between society and its bio-physical environment but maintains if not reifies sociologies underlying (Western epistemological) tradition of human exceptionalism and/or anthropocentrism; whereas the other pole, “ecological sociology” refers to a transformation of sociology entire to take into account the (dialectical, interdependent ontoepistemological, and/or ontogenetical) inseparability of whatever we may – between different disciplinary discourses, come to agree to understand under the terms “the social” and “the ecological”. But even in 1995, Canadian sociologist Raymond Murphy could state that sociology at large was still sociology-as-if-nature-didn’t-matter and that it was imperative to create sociology-in-which-nature-matters.

Academic disciplines often suffer from collective amnesia towards their genealogical chapters, and 20th century sociology post WW II, for a variety of reasons (beginning, certainly, with both its fear of being associated with Social Darwinism on the one hand, and its strange existential angst regarding equivocation), has largely forgotten its “debt to biology”. But among its founders, the ecological embeddedness of society was not a contested issue: Max Weber, for example, revered and took inspiration from Victor Hehn’s 1870 book on the transmission of plants and animals (Kulturpflanzen und Hausthiere in ihrem Übergang aus Asien nach Griechenland und Italien sowie das übrige Europa. Historisch-linguistische Skizzen.) among others, and can, as some have argued, serve as a “classical foundation for a postexemptionalist sociology” while such a sociology, surely, also needs to take inspiration form postcolonial theory and decolonial options.

Among the main challenges today, for such a postexemptionalist social sciences, especially with their focus on “Euromodernity”, is the transition to the so-called bioeconomy: In European biotechno-politico-economic elite circles, it is taken for granted that we already partially live in and continue along the transition to a bioeconomy. While national or supranational (European Commission, OECD) agendas differ in regard to both the composition (agriculture, biofuels, biomedicine, etc.) of what is to be understood as “bioeconomy”, a minimal consensus between them around the main unit of reference, “biomass”, emerges: “Biotechnology is to be deployed for human flourishing/social progress/sustainability while enabling profitability/competitiveness/exploitation-efficiency.” BioEconomy (sic!), as an extension of Euro-Modernity, continues to follow, thus, a logic of extraction, while promising to be a solution for present and future challenges from feeding 9.6 billion people by 2050 to climate change: It promises to be an agent of social progress, justice, and equality, but is conceptualized via an exploitative form of productivity, anthropic/anthropocentric (optimizable) utility, and value as monetizable/quantifiable/maximizable. It is imperative for us to get a genealogical and critical hold on BioEconomy (sic!) as an extension of Euro-Modernity today, expose some of its discontents and conflicts (such as functioning like a colonial archive technology by exercising forms of ontopower), and to create and assess possible alternatives that can help realize generative justice for circular economies that enroll more-than-human agents as partners based on past, present and future bioeoconomies in the plural.

 

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In which I coin the term venting machine and talk about the Culture of ‘Schadenfreude’ .

[Coming soon, right here, at this blog]

 

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There is, today, a lot of conversation about “fake news”.  There is, even and already, a bit of a fatigue regarding the intellectual discussion of this issue – not only among those sharing the currently quite en vogue anti-intellectual sentiment, but even among intellectual people themselves. Still, there are a few noteworthy things to be said about the issue, about its emergence, its prevalence, and about how to tackle it in the long-run. I want to focus here on only a select few, and point them out quickly. To anyone familiar with my writings, some of what I identify is going to be very obvious, indeed. This is, also, not a finally word on the issue. It is, like many things on this blog, an initial exploration, open for critical discussion, and meant to be revised and improved over time.

When today I stumbled  over the following “news” item Sean Hannity Flips Out After Getting Busted Sharing Fake News (http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/sean-hannity-mccain-fake-news_us_58af9677e4b0a8a9b780d36a?), which is, actually, a kind of “meta-news”, since it is news about a news-maker (falling for fake-news, and then being enraged over news about his falling for fake news – it’s a meta-news item, then of the third order, no?), I had to laugh, because, well, none of this is, actually, “news” but it illustrates various issues and dimensions packed into the current discourse of and on “fake news”. The whole question here is about some Tweets by Mr. Hannity – a media personality, working for a large US-American media company. This Mr. Hannity tweeted a link to a story by someone, which he qualified with “Wow if true”. Now, let us think about this for a moment: What is or makes  news “the news”? We have come to a moment in history, at least in the Global North, where every “item” that may carry information is considered news-worthy if it purports “relevance”; mind you (and pace Habermas), not a truth claim but a claim to relevance. Relevance, I might add in channeling Tyler Burge, as a kind of warrant would be a warrant kind of entitlement not a warrant kind of justification. Tentatively we could say, that this makes for two kinds of possible understanding of what “news” is: News is either current information about the world which is already partially warranted and seeking further warrant through justification, or news is what is deemed relevant (qua an entitlement structure). Anyone familiar with my more recent work and thought process knows that there is this thing I talk about, which I call “economy of  relevance” of which  “attention economies” are a particular aspect of – which is something that I see as being similar in some ways to what philosopher Bernard Stiegler is writing about, for example in his book Taking Care of Youth and Generations. I do not so much care about this  particular “fake news” story then being debunked, Mr.Hannity being called out, then him being upset, etc.  What I find interesting is (a) that this falls into one category of what “news” is, or rather has increasingly become (in and of itself, this turn to relevance and warrant qua entitlement over justification is nothing new itself, but more a cascading expansion of tabloid press: the tabloidization of “the news”, if you prefer to call it that. Perhaps, Boris Groys’s book on the question of what is “the new” would be an interesting read here as well); and (b) that any news-person, such as Mr. Hannity, who is working for an organization of the very size and  very means as his employer could offer, should(!) have editorial staff at their disposal who would check the claims made in any source – this could sometimes be called fact-checking, but I would refrain from calling it that, because sometimes even news-worthy items in the “justifiable news”-category cannot be fully verified as to their facticity in a given moment (I will admit that I have been wondering about the notion of “alternative facts”, that has been thrown around by members of the Trumpites, as being  Heideggerian in origin: after all, Heidegger distinguishes between facticity and factuality; but this may be problematic, with Heidegger’s political affiliation with the original master’s of populism and propaganda, no?), so I would prefer to call it plausibility-checking.  But this is precisely my point, the issue is, very often, one of plausibility. What has gone out of the window with the emergent dominance of relevance-driven news-cycles is not so much the question of checking “fact versus fake” in terms of truth, what has really gone out of the window is to check for plausibility. Facts are states of affairs in so far as facts present (as) truth-claims about states of affairs. And in practice, news organizations (regardless of their political couleur) when confronted with an item that might be news-worthy, they should at the very least do a plausibility-check (even if the fact-check as truth-check cannot be conducted to its fullness). But this doesn’t happen (as often) anymore for two reasons: (a) Quite practically (or in terms of social ontology), because there seems to be less spending on editorial staff in both numbers and competence, there are less staff available to work on a news item and there is an ever increasing number of interns and other low-paid, overworked (precariate) workers doing the job that a host of well-trained, well-paid, and well-rested editorial staffers should be doing (just think of the increasing number of typos, grammatical errors, etc. in online-outlets of even the most established news producers); (b) Because (in terms of social epistemology) we have and continue to exchange  plausibility with relevance , or at least, we value relevance more than plausibility (btw, this counts for news the same as it does for research grant proposals, which are subject to a similar kind of relevance economy). And relevance is somewhat of a construct. This is, I think, also something where philosophers and intellectuals of various could come to an agreement over, regardless of where they come down epistemologically  on the question of what “truth” is. I think that it is worth for them exploring this notion of plausibility here, because intellectuals of various camps (so-called realists against so-called Postmodernists) have been mutually “blaming each other for Trump”.

But sometimes, it’s not even about plausibility, but about how economies of relevance and cultures of relevance clash. Think of the question of the recent “news” about French presidential candidate Macron’s sexual orientation (http://www.zeit.de/politik/2017-02/fake-news-emanuel-macron-russland-rekonstruktion/komplettansicht), which people claim is a “fake story” launched by “the Russians”. I am interested here  not so much in the truth or plausibility alone, or even who is “really behind” the story (do I, btw, sense a new genre of “Whodunnit?” stories here – novels that are not murder mysteries but mysteries about who launched these news and why?). What is interesting is the question, why and in what manner do people think that Monsieur Macron’s sexuality is relevant and why would anyone want to use it for political gain? Again, I am not interested in “the Russians” (or any other “collective” ascriptions), but in the fact that there is two news items here: One is about Monsieur Macron’s sexuality, the other news item is about “the Russians” spreading this for political gain.  So whoever spreads the news about the sexuality of Monsieur Macron has assumptions about why people would be interested (and these assumptions say something about how these people think of the French people, for example). Those who talk about “the Russians” have assumptions about how “these Russians” think about how “the French” think about sexuality, i.e. that someone being a politician being homosexual might be a problem for the French, or that he is married to a woman while having sex with men might be a problem, etc. etc. But perhaps people in France don’t care, or perhaps the voters “these Russians” supposedly seek to swing to, supposedly, vote for Front National  wouldn’t care,  etc. Take the comparative case of Germany (which I know a bit better), where sexuality is something people consider something that is best left inside one’s own four walls, i.e. Germans think sex and sexual orientation of their political personnel is something that is their private affair and has no place in political debate – hence, we had politicians in high offices, who were known to be gay and when some news media were trying to make it into something, it turned out that the majority of people didn’t really care and actually rewarded said politicians if they were themselves taking a “so what?” attitude (see the case of Berlin governor Klaus Wowereit, who simply stated “I’m gay, and that is good.”, which basically said: So what, and that’s it.) One could assume, but this is only an assumption, that those voters in France who aren’t already voting Front National (which always had an anti-gay faction, despite current attempts to portray the party as more neutral on this question) may not be too interested in what happens in Monsieur Macron’s bed-room. Or maybe they are. But my point here is, that there are different assumptions in-play about is deemed as relevant, and so are, sometimes, efforts to reconstruct  what relevance is: See the disparity of the gravity of offense between the Clinton emails and the various problems the Trumpite camp has in maintaining their digital security. Regardless of how even so-called liberal media who were more on Clinton’s side reported on it, the fact that they reported to such a large amount and degree on the Clinton email  issue says a lot about relevance as well as that even their reporting often did jump the gun, forsaking plausibility for relevance.

For news organizations, mainly, the issue of relevance is not only which news are deemed relevant, but (as I have written previously on the issue of, for example, research grant proposals and the prestige economy in academia) but to stay relevant themselves. So they often will report what might be “relevant news” as quickly as possible (hence the inflation of the “breaking news” genre in the past fifteen or so years), in order to not appear “irrelevant”. The logic here is: Better to appear relevant, even if utterly wrong, than to be right but appear as not being able to present what is currently and in the moment deemed (most) relevant. In the same vein, currently US comedians jump on everything the Trumpites do and try and make it funny – they thrive on relevance, too. But one can ask, if this contribution to the economy of relevance – which gives itself a guise of “criticism” –  is not contributing to the problem. What if these comedians from  Colbert to John Oliver and so on, stopped being funny about and got serious for a while, because what they talk about is serious? For late night shows in the US, their economies of relevance comes in two layers, too: What is relevant in the news cycles, and what is relevantly funny. But if, what is relevant were truly serious and truly serious to them, why make it funny? If the matters were so serious, for example with real lives being (plausibly) at stake, shouldn’t they not stop being funny to also convey the seriousness of the matter? The answer to this question is not an easy one, for certainly many people wouldn’t even listen to the message if it wasn’t presented in a funny way, and that way they at least here the message  – though, what is the/a “message” here, one could ask? But it also seems, presently, that comedians as well as many news outlets, after years of decline in audience, have profited from the current political situation. They appear more relevant, again. In the world of news, so many economies of relevance have become entangled that it is nearly impossible to make sense of them with any analytical clarity. What I wanted to point out here, though, is that two main trends over a long time have contributed to the current fray: The substitution of plausibility with relevance, and the decline in quality editing. And these two are dimensions, I claim, we seriously need to talk more about.

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